An example is the LRA's attacks on DRC refugee camps. This type of refugee community can become what Lisher calls a state-in-exile, a coherent militant community exploited by violent actors for its operations. Across Africa, UNHCR works to ensurethat the displaced have access to services such as education and health care. The Burundi Hutu rebel faction attacked refugees near the Congolese border, saying that its fighters were pursuing Burundian soldiers who fled to the camp from a nearby military position. Examples are disputes in Mtabila and Myovosi refugee camps (Tanzatina) among Hutu and Tutsi refugees during the year 2003. This means that these attacks are most common in practice, but records are missing. The fact that refugee camps were used as hideouts for VNSAs makes them more likely to become a terrorist safe haven than the target of a terrorist attack. [25] The intensity of violence was high also in Pakistan, where large security operations within the refugee camps had been conducted. [7] Pini also addressed this issue, trying to affect more African states, but especially those with a large refugee population. [18] BBC (2013) UN protests at 'Rwandan refugee abductions' in Uganda.. That can also mediate the risk of conflict. [17] Poor security conditions persist in 2/3 of all refugee camps in Africa. This includes a total of six types of refugee-related political violence. More than 80 million people have been displaced worldwide and crucial information needs to reach them, too. This includes several cases that are known worldwide. In some of the affected border areas close to trouble spots in East Africa, the flow of refugeeshas triggered tensions and conflicts inside the host countries. African countries are weaker and usually do not have the capacity to manage the influx of refugees properly. [32] N. Murshid (2014) The Politics of Refugees in South Asia: Identity, resistance, manipulation, New York: Routledge p. 60. The fact that most of the violence was limited to just a small number of states, especially in Asia, is consistent with Lischer's finding that refugee-related violence is usually connected to specific states. These qualitative studies include the work of Bariagaber, who focuses on the Horn of Africa region. Another example of a quantitative study is the work done by Kreibaum. Conversely, Benin and Ghana have a small community of refugees, and violence has occurred. The occurrence of refugee-related political violence was usually linked to the size of the refugee population, the time and protracted situation of this population and the capacity of the receiving state to manage the influx of refugees. [9] The work focuses mainly on India and Pakistan. The pressure on refugee-hosting states is growing, the number of refugees is increasing and it is necessary to ensure them decent living conditions and take care of their protection and security. On the other hand, Jordan had just one case of refugee-related violence in 2016, despite the sizeable Palestinian community that resided there. Principles relating to processing and protection of personal data may be found here in the Czech language. Figure no. Nevertheless, what does this mean for the global refugee population? Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau or Malawi have a very small refugee community, and no refugee-related political violence has occurred in these states. The rise in intensity of violence can be seen after 2011. Almost 60 percent do not cross national borders but are displaced within their own country. Violent groups then used the opportunity to attack, recruit or enslave refugees. Only seven cases were reported. The second mechanism is when refugees provide mobilisation resources for domestic opposition. Nonetheless, refugee camps were not the primary target of VNSA violence in Asia, and we can conclude that VNSAs targeted mostly local civilian or government targets and not specifically refugees. Some cases involve refugee related political violence, but others do not. Forty percent of all refugees are children under the age of 18. Nevertheless, in some instances, camps became hideouts or bases for terrorist groups and their recruitment on both continents. You can find more information in our data protection declaration. [3] M.P. The vast majority of African refugee camps have poor security conditions. For example, Murshid reports tendencies of usually peaceful Rohingya to militarise refugee camps in Bangladesh partially as an answer to mistreatment by Bangladeshi authorities which can in effect create tensions inside the community or towards the receiving state. To be more specific, the highest persistence of violence is in DRC, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan. However, our research shows that if the refugee population in a country is extensive, with more than 100,000 individuals, the chances of violence are higher. This finding is consistent with a broader trend of decrease in intrastate conflicts, and it further highlights the shift from state-led violence towards non-state actors becoming one of the defining forces in today's conflicts. Refugees exert economic, environmental, political and security pressure on the host states. In Africa, the number of state cross-border violence remained low. This indicates that the size of the refugee population had some impact, but other factors were involved, too. This type of violence typically occurred in Pakistan, Syria and Lebanon. The presence of refugees in the state increases the possibility of political violence. In Africa, the refugee population was more evenly spread out. An example is LRA activity in DRC or the Central African Republic. The categories are clearly and logically delimited. This finding highlights that the Syrian civil war was a pivotal moment. There are very famous cases from the past; for example, the attacks by Palestinian refugees in Lebanon or the involvement of refugees in the structures of the terrorist group Al-Shabaab and their violent activity in Kenyan territory. CEJISS is an integral part of Metropolitan University Prague. 5: Frequency of refugee-related political violence in Asia by state (2003-2018). The data shows that this expansion is necessary because this new category, where violent non-state actors perpetrate violence, is widespread. The number of refugees increased significantly, and armed conflicts, as well as refugee-related violence, considerably changed its character. Few studies have so far dealt with this phenomenon. [20] On the other hand, VNSA attacks in Kenya or Niger were less intense. This explains the difference in violence frequency. It should be noted that the frequency, persistence and intensity were much lower than in cases with high refugee communities such as Uganda, DRC or Cameroon. In Asia, these cases were linked to jihadist groups, mainly in relation to the Syrian civil war. Assessments in Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania show that this need is very different depending on the location. On the other hand, there are cases that violate these rules. This also describes to a limited extent the intensity of violence. This difference can be explained by the different characteristics of some non-state actors operating on both continents. In addition, groups that compete in the home country often compete with each other in refugee camps as well. [13] Sarah K. Lischer (2001), Refugee-Related Political Violence: When? The research itself seeks to reveal the reasons for the radicalisation of refugees. The highest frequency and persistence of violence were both reported in Israel/Palestine. Hamas and its affiliates were using refugee facilities in the Gaza Strip and West Bank as safe havens and bases for its operations. [4] These authors conduct a simple statistical analysis to determine which type of violence is most common and where violence occurs most often. The bloodiest attack ever is the FNL attack in Burundi. They hide in the camps and abuse financial aid. Source: UNHCR Statistics, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/dataviz/6. The aim of this work is to describe the development of refugee-related political violence in the last 15 years. Although primarily in Asia, it seems that the link is not as clear, with some countries, e.g., Turkey or China, not being affected by refugee-related violence, despite having large refugee populations. This is groundbreaking compared to the study of Lischer, and it illustrates a rapid development of the phenomenon. Source: authors' own graph, data from BBC, UNHCR, New Humanitarian, NY Times. Refugee-related political violence is a phenomenon that is not currently in decline. [1] These people flee not only because of war conflicts, ethnic or religious violence but also because of natural disasters such as droughts or floods. eISSN 1805-482X, ISSN 1802-548X, https://doi.org/10.51870/CEJISS.XKVV3716. ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African StatesFNL - The National Forces of Liberation (Forces Nationales de Libration)ICGLR - International Conference of the Great Lakes RegionLRA - Lord's Resistance ArmyUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesVNSA Violent Non-State ActorGTD Global Terrorism DatabaseISIS Islamic State of Iraq and SyriaIDPs Internally displaced personsUNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. This research is based on a study conducted by Lischer (2001) but introduces a new category. Violence in relation to refugees is also described by other authors. [8]J. Pini (2013), Political Violence and the African Refugee Experience, Washington: Review of International Affairs, p- 3-9. This concept is clear, and the division and classification of cases into categories cannot be called into question, as it is in a case of study that was conducted by Gineste and Savun. All three countries hosted Palestinian refugees, and most of the reported violence was related to the Palestinian community. Reliable information is often essential for survival, especially in times of great uncertainty. Countries where no incidence of refugee-related political violence was reported were not used in the graph. 3: Type of refugee-related political violence in Africa (2003-2018). The information in these reports does not sufficiently cover events in remote African and Asian states. However, at the same time, fighting over control with anti-jihadist militant groups formed by Palestinian refugees, namely The Sons of Yarmouk Movement. [6]A.N. The camp sheltered ethnic Tutsi refugees from Congo known as the Banyamulenge who fled the violence in North Kivu. [22] H. Haider (2014),Refugee, IDP and host community radicalization, Birmingham: GSDRC, p. 10-11. This can be primarily attributed to the terrorist groups operating in the Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq) and using the refugee camps as safe havens to conduct terrorist attacks in the host countries and consequently the security forces of the host states intervening in the refugee camps. [9] N. Murshid (2014), The Politics of Refugees in South Asia, London: Routledge, p. 1-6. Learn more about current emergencies in Africa and across the world on the Emergencies page. In Asia, the most frequent type was the violence between refugees and the government of receiving state, which was reported 15 times.

The second graph shows the countries with the highest levels of violence, ranked by frequency. In some cases, one type of incident occurs several times over the years.

Most of these B cases involve violent clashes between refugees and the police or military of the receiving state, who try to control and reduce the number of refugees, often at the cost of violating human rights and international conventions. In Asia, we observed more protracted conflicts. [22] Moreover, even some countries that hosted many refugees in the protracted situation did not experience refugee-related violence frequently. For the purposes of our research, we decided to use her theoretical concept because her approach is the most accurate and thoughtful. Examples when large-scale violence occurs (several people have died or it involves hundreds to thousands of individuals) are mostly recorded. How Much?, Massachusetts: Center for International Studies, p. 8-9. Eighty-five percent of those who do leave flee to neighboring developing countries. Momen (2021), The Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Implications for Regional Security, Berlin: Springer. We reported only two cases. In particular, this concerns 40 African states. They also analyse which type of violence is most common. < https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17142763/> (accessed 04 October 2020). The countries with the largest refugee communities are Cameroon, Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The data presented here add new dimensions to the discourse about refugees and security. Your opinion can help us make it better. [29] A. Ramadan (2009) Destroying Nahr el-Bared: Sovereignty and urbicide in the space of exception.Political Geography 28(3), p. 155-156. The most frequent type of violence is violence involving VNSA.